SYMPOSIUM: PANDEMICS AND THE CONSTITUTION
PANDEMIC SURVEILLANCE – THE NEW PREDICTIVE
POLICING
Michael Gentithes* and Harold J. Krent**
Now that the first wave of the coronavirus is behind us, what will the
future bring? As governments reopen society following lengthy stay-athome orders, they must strike a difficult balance. If the return to normalcy
is too abrupt, infections could spike again in just a few months, creating a
death toll as high as it might have been with no quarantine at all.1 An
effective removal of quarantine orders, then, must ensure that the return
to normalcy is appropriately paced. But how can we best plan to put our
economy back together without jeopardizing public health?
Officials in New York state have echoed Italy’s call for a staged
return to normalcy by first allowing only those testing positive for the
virus’ antibodies (who presumably now are immune) to return to work
and travel. 2 Would creation of such a two-class society comport with
constitutional dictates? In other words, can the government in effect create
classes of citizenship based on the greater or lesser likelihood that some
will catch the disease?
In Part I, we examine the growth of predictive policing, which
similarly treats some individuals differently based on the likelihood that
they will either commit or be the victim of a crime. If such surveillance
does not lead to detention, incursion on the right to travel, or other loss of
freedom, we believe such efforts to be constitutional, even though not
* Assistant Professor, University of Akron School of Law. I dedicate this Article to the loving memory
of Lula Gentithes, who would have encouraged me to write it.
** Professor of Law, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. The Coronavirus Outbreak: Trump says he’s ‘looking at a date’ to begin easing
restrictions, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 17, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/us/coronavirusupdates-usa.html?action=click&module=Spotlight&pgtype=Homepage#link-cfe0b1a
[https://perma.cc/AK3H-6U89].
2. See Jason Horowitz, In Italy, Going Back to Work May Depend on Having the Right
Antibodies, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/04/world/europe/italycoronavirus-antibodies.html [https://perma.cc/HTA6-RTS5].
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always wise. Use of data to prioritize law enforcement efforts poses no
insuperable constitutional obstacles. But deployment of predictive
analytics can result in infringement on the right to liberty, as we relate. In
Part II, therefore, we apply the lessons from the predictive policing
context to assess current and potential expansion of public health
surveillance in the midst of the pandemic. As with predictive policing, if
the government focuses its data collection efforts on those most likely to
contract the virus, no constitutional issue arises. But, if the government
imposes a quarantine on those with the virus, a detention has occurred,
and if the government then restricts the freedoms of those who are likeliest
to catch the virus thereafter, then the rights to work and travel have been
undermined. Courts then must balance the government’s public health
interest against the constitutional infringement on the fundamental rights
of work 3 and travel. 4 Based on the limited precedents to date, the
government must demonstrate that any two-track system is highly critical
to protect the community and also provide those in the lower class some
limited opportunity to challenge the government’s classification, which
would leave them stripped of the right to travel and possibly their ability
to pursue a livelihood. Given that the balance between governmental
power and individual rights tips towards the government in times of crisis,
we end in Part III by suggesting the constraints that the government should
respect when casting such a wide surveillance net.
I. PREDICTIVE POLICING
Police departments around the country have experimented in using
data to predict where crimes will be committed and who is likely to be
involved, whether as a perpetrator or victim. For the most part, those
efforts have raised few constitutional issues. But, when the predictions
result in an incursion on liberty, Fourth Amendment and other
constitutional problems arise. We will briefly canvas some of the
emerging forms of predictive policing and then address where, in our
view, such policing crosses the line into unconstitutionality.
Subsequently, we will apply that baseline to the health surveillance that
has already occurred in the past few months, and that which is likely to
arise in the future.
Predictive policing embraces data analytics to identify where crime
is likely to occur and identify likely perpetrators. There is an obvious

3.
4.

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 97 (1873).
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999).
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correlation between past and future crimes.5 For instance, many police
departments predict “hot” crime spots, and then assign extra personnel to
patrol the area. Using data analytics, Sacramento police determined in
2012, that there were forty-two hot spots in the city and assigned extra
personnel there accordingly. 6 The Department reported a significant drop
in serious crime. Police in Memphis, Shreveport, and Minneapolis
similarly relied on data analytics to determine “hot” spots and thus
allocate resources to mitigate the risk of crime. 7 These methods are
designed to help police departments operate more efficiently by allocating
resources and personnel to areas where crimes are likely to occur. Such
efforts to shift resources to protect particularly vulnerable geographic
locations raise no appreciable constitutional issues.
Other communities, most notably Chicago, have also used data
analytics to focus on individuals—as opposed to locations—most likely
to be involved in violent crime. Based on a variety of factors including
neighborhood, associations, and past involvement in crime, the Chicago
Police Department decided to deliver notifications to those most at risk of
being involved in violent crime, whether as the perpetrator or the victim. 8
That strategy derived from the sociological “network approach,” which
concluded that
victimization is not simply a function of spatial proximity or of
individual risk factors such as age, race, gender, or gang affiliation, but
also of how people are connected, the structure of the overall network,
the types of behaviors occurring in the network, and an individual’s
position in the overall structure. 9

5. “[P]redictive policing entails the application of quantitative techniques to forecast where
criminal activities might occur in the (near) future. The predictions based on these analytic tools can
guide the decision-making of law enforcement agencies, especially with the deployment of its
personnel.” Albert Meijer & Martijn Wessels, Predictive Policing: Review of Benefits and
Drawbacks, 42 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 1031, 1032 (2019) (citations omitted).
6. See, e.g., WALTER L. PERRY ET AL., PREDICTIVE POLICING: THE ROLE OF CRIME
FORECASTING IN LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 61–62 (2013), https://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR233/RAND_RR233.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y72H-SYVS].
7. Id. at 64–76.
8. Jeremy Gorner, Chicago Police Use “Heat List” as Strategy to Prevent Violence, CHI.
TRIB. (Aug. 21, 2013), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2013-08-21-ct-met-heat-list20130821-story.html [https://perma.cc/7UH6-6FAP].
9. Andrew V. Papachristos & Christopher Wildeman, Network Exposure and Homicide
Victimization in an African American Community, 104 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 143, 143 (2014).
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That approach mirrored efforts in the public health field. 10 The closer
individuals were to others who were victims or killers, the more likely that
they would end up as a perpetrator or victim. Although Chicago never
released its algorithm, it announced that the algorithm included: 1)
criminal record; 2) record of violence among the subject’s criminal
associates; 3) gang membership; 4) degree to which the subject’s criminal
activities are on the rise; and 5) types and intensity of criminal history. 11
The Department also asserted that it continuously was modifying the
factors. Notifications offered social services such as job training and anger
management, but they also carried with them a threat.12 Police warned that
if those on the heat list ever committed a violent crime, prosecutors would
seek an enhanced sentence. Although not binding on the court, police
elicited prosecutors’ support and intended the threat to coerce
compliance. 13
Chicago’s predictive policing program raises two constitutional
questions. First, to the extent that detectives used the list to investigate
crimes, would that probabilistic use of data violate the Fourth
Amendment? Second, would the threat to charge perpetrators with more
serious crimes if they had been previously warned violate Due Process?
In response to incidents of violent crime, targeting those on the heat
list is understandable, if perhaps unfortunate. Those individuals would be
investigated not based on any conduct, but only on their propensity to be
either perpetrators or victims of crime. And, if the algorithm’s factors are
correlated with race, which we discuss later, then the heat list would lead
to discriminatory investigations by Chicago police. Officers might then
uncover more crime committed by the targeted racial group, perpetuating
a cycle of high criminality for individuals in that group.
Although the prospect of racial bias cannot be discounted, using the
heat list for enhanced scrutiny is not unconstitutional per se.
Investigations do not themselves curtail liberties. The individuals targeted
for enhanced scrutiny are still free to travel and associate with whomever

10. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1109,
1134–42 (2017).
11. CHICAGO POLICE DEPT., SPECIAL ORDER S09-11, SUBJECT ASSESSMENT AND
INFORMATION DASHBOARD (2019), http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57b85155e9f4b-50c15-5e9f-7742e3ac8b0ab2d3.html [https://perma.cc/FB5B-M9B4].
12. CHICAGO POLICE DEPT., SPECIAL ORDER S10-05, CUSTOM NOTIFICATIONS IN CHICAGO
http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57bf0-1456faf9-bfa14-570a(2015),
a2deebf33c56ae59.pdf?hl=true [https://perma.cc/W87L-BRWX].
13. Chicago was by no means alone. See Ferguson, supra note 10, at 1146 (relaying that Kansas
City police also succeeded in obtaining enhanced punishment for those offenders ignoring warnings).
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they choose. The unwanted attention of course can be invidious, but police
have free rein to investigate whom they please.
Would presence on the heat list justify a Terry stop? 14 We believe
that presence on the heat list does not come close to providing the
reasonable suspicion requisite for a brief investigatory stop, but it might
add to the reasonable suspicion if the investigating officers can point to
objective factors individuating their suspicion that the individual is
suspected of a particular offense. Reasonable suspicion cannot arise
merely from probabilistic data that an individual will be involved in some
type of violent crime in the future. 15
Most profoundly, in our view, the threat of enhanced punishment
violates Due Process. Punishment would be increased—assuming that
prosecutors and courts agree 16—in light of the refusal to heed a police
warning. 17 Two individuals committing the same crime, therefore, might
be punished differently on that basis alone. To be sure, sentencing
guidelines include a wide range of conduct justifying enhancements of
sentences, such as refusal to show remorse or committing a crime in a
particularly heinous manner. But the failure to heed a police warning to
stay clear of danger differs in two principal respects. First, unlike with
sentencing enhancements, it is the police department that has specified the
condition warranting enhanced punishment, not the legislature.
Sentencing policy is not made at the police level. Second, the punishment
criterion is not sufficiently linked to commission of the crime to justify
the enhancement. A state cannot enhance the crime of burglary based on
indicia not directly related to the offense, such as on a finding that the
individual has failed to hold down a job or failed to volunteer at a local
community center. 18 Failure to heed a generalized warning to obey the
law does not justify enhanced punishment; all individuals are presumed

14. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
15. See United States v. Mendez, 467 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he fact of gang
membership is not sufficient to generate a particularized, reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity . . . .”).
16. Most likely, the higher charges resulted in plea agreements of more years.
17. Punishments in fact have been enhanced. See Josh Kaplan, Predictive Policing and the
SIDE
WEEKLY
(July
12,
2017),
Long
Road
to
Transparency,
SOUTH
https://southsideweekly.com/predictive-policing-long-road-transparency/ [https://perma.cc/9EX33XHC].
18. For an argument that the heat scores violate the right to association, see THOMAS Q. FORD,
PITFALLS OF PREDICTIVE POLICING: LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES ARISING FROM THE CHICAGO
POLICE DEPARTMENT’S PREDICTIVE POLICING INITIATIVES (2018) (unpublished manuscript on file
with the authors).
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to understand that they must obey the law. 19 Even if encapsulated in a
legislative directive, therefore, enhanced punishment predicated on
ignoring the special warning violates Due Process.
The danger of conditioning liberty on probabilistic data in sentencing
is highlighted by the evidence-based sentencing adopted by over twenty
states. 20 Those states use predictive analytics to predict the likelihood of
recidivism. The algorithm relies on factors such as the offender’s
socioeconomic status and level of education. Predicating liberty on
statistics, particularly when the statistics derive from individual
characteristics beyond the offender’s control, departs from fundamental
notions of moral desert. Even supporters of such risk-based sentencing
call for limits on the use of static factors beyond an individual’s control
within the assessments in order to ensure fundamental fairness. 21
To be sure, the length of punishment often is tied to predictions about
the amount of time needed for deterrence, the likelihood of recidivism,
and so forth. But reliance on such factors can also result in racial
discrimination. ProPublica released a study of risk assessment for
recidivism—like those used by the states above for sentencing—assigned
to 7,000 people in Broward County, Florida for the purpose of
determining whether to release those individuals on bail. 22 The data
revealed that race played a substantial factor in the recidivism projection,
which then led to greater jail time for African Americans who committed
similar offenses to whites. ProPublica tentatively concluded that the
questions Florida law enforcement authorities asked about socioeconomic status and demographic conditions, such as whether a parent
had been in jail or the number of people known to have used illegal drugs,
played a substantial role in the bond decisions. These examples
demonstrate that, when sentencing algorithms are driven by underlying
data, that data may be linked to race.
19. See, e.g., State v. Cerritos-Valdez, 889 N.W.2d 605 (Neb. 2017) (holding that punishment
cannot be enhanced solely because an offender is undocumented, because that status is unconnected
to the conduct underlying the offense); see also State v. Avalos Valdez, 934 N.W.2d 585 (Iowa 2019)
(holding that a defendant’s undocumented status may be considered in sentencing only to the extent
it relates to an otherwise relevant factor).
20. Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 805 (2014).
21. See Christopher Slobogin, A Defense of Modern Risk-Based Sentencing, in RISK AND
RETRIBUTION: THE ETHICS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PREDICTIVE SENTENCING (J. de Keijser, et al.
eds., forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3242257 [https://perma.cc/
B3DW-6KT4].
22. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
[https://perma.cc/SY9M-CY8S].
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In short, predicating liberty on predictive analytics risks injustice.
Just deserts should be based (to the extent possible) on the offender’s
conduct, as well as on the related risk that the offender will commit serious
crimes in the near term. 23 Algorithms that consider individual
characteristics in addition to broader societal interests should rely upon
characteristics that are both pertinent to the offender’s future conduct and
fair to consider because they fall within the offender’s control. Any
algorithm risks including factors that are correlated with race or other
invidious distinction. Chicago’s use of its heat list to increase punishment
should not survive constitutional scrutiny.
II. APPLICATION TO PANDEMIC SURVEILLANCE
The predictive policing and sentencing examples frame at least some
of the risks of reliance on pandemic surveillance. We first inquire about
the probabilistic decision to isolate an individual whom the state believes
may be sick and then turn to the quarantine decision for someone who was
exposed. Afterwards, we speculate about the use of such probabilities to
determine, after the first wave of the pandemic has subsided, who can
return to work, school, and travel.
A.

Temperature Capture Policies and the Constitution

Consider the possible constitutional issues if the government were to
adopt China’s extreme steps to use body temperature as a crucial datapoint
in determining who can safely work and travel through society. 24 Chinese
officials have deployed so-called “thermometer guns,” which take an
individual’s temperature through a scan of his or her forehead to check for
possible coronavirus infections near airports, apartment buildings, and
shopping malls. 25 They have also begun using infrared thermal scanners
that detect the body heat of each passenger entering railway stations. 26 In
America, private employers have begun monitoring employee
temperatures with traditional thermometers in order to ensure their

23. Slobogin, supra note 21.
24. Shawn Yuan, How China is Using AI and Big Data to Fight the Coronavirus, AL JAZEERA
(Mar. 1, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/03/china-ai-big-data-combat-coronavirusoutbreak-200301063901951.html [https://perma.cc/HTY2-VFGC].
25. Emily Rauhala, Some Countries Use Temperature Checks for Coronavirus. Others Don’t
Bother. Here’s Why., WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/coronavirus-temperature-screening/2020/03/14/24185be0-6563-11ea-912dd98032ec8e25_story.html [https://perma.cc/3P54-DGGV].
26. Yuan, supra note 24.
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workforce’s safety. 27 Though that private action does not raise Fourth
Amendment concerns, such concerns will be raised if the government
adopts similar measures in the weeks and months ahead.
First, consider whether various government actions to capture
individual temperatures would amount to a search. The Fourth
Amendment typically requires the government to obtain a warrant based
upon probable cause to believe that an individual has committed a crime
before conducting any activity that amounts to a “search.” But that term
is notoriously amorphous. The Supreme Court has held that the
government conducts a search when its actions violate an individual’s
reasonable expectations of privacy, 28 or when the government trespasses
upon an individual’s property. 29
Although thermometer guns do reveal some limited health
information, government use of them may not amount to searches. They
appear more akin to warrantless breathalyzer tests at the scene of an arrest,
which the Court has found limited enough not to be considered searches
under the Fourth Amendment. 30 Thermometer guns are even less invasive
than a breathalyzer, as they do not require the subject to actively partake
in the investigator’s measurement. Thermometer guns can also take
measurements even more rapidly than a breathalyzer, again making them
less constitutionally suspect.
Use of infrared thermal scanners, however, present a closer question.
First, it is unclear exactly what images of an individual the scanners
reveal. The Supreme Court has held that when the government deploys
investigative technologies that are not in general public use to reveal
details from inside one’s home, they have conducted a search. 31 That
doctrine’s applicability in places of public accommodation is less clear,
27. Melissa Repko, As Coronavirus Cases Grow, Some of the Largest US Employers Including
Walmart and Amazon Turn to Thermometers as Detection Tool, CNBC (Apr. 4, 2020, 9:50 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/04/coronavirus-walmart-amazon-turn-to-thermometers-asdetection-tool.html [https://perma.cc/H52A-G9YE]; David Yaffe-Bellany, ‘Thermometer Guns’ on
Coronavirus Front Lines Are ‘Notoriously Not Accurate’, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/14/business/coronavirus-temperature-sensor-guns.html
[https://perma.cc/AF4R-MNUV].
28. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012).
30. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184 (2016). In contrast, blood tests are
“significantly more intrusive” and less likely to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
depending upon the circumstances. Id.
31. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“[O]btaining by sense-enhancing
technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been
obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a search—at
least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use.”) (quoting Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
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but if the government were to attach such scanners in private buildings
without consent, its actions likely would amount to a Fourth Amendment
search.
Temperature grab technology, however, may be constitutionally
deployed under an exception to the warrant requirement. Even if the
government conducts a search, if its actions are reasonable, they may not
require a warrant based upon probable cause. For instance, the
government may not need a warrant based upon probable cause if “special
needs” make obtaining a warrant impracticable and the government’s
primary purpose is not general crime control. 32 The special needs doctrine
seems likely to apply. Obtaining individual warrants for temperature
readings on hundreds of millions of citizens is extremely impracticable,
and the government need to pace the lifting of quarantine orders is highly
critical. So long as the government’s primary purpose in grabbing
temperatures remains to control the spread of COVID-19, rather than
bring criminal charges against quarantine violators, these policies likely
would satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s strictures. 33
Even if Fourth Amendment hurdles can be overcome, governments
should be wary of the ability of temperature grabbing technologies to
provide useful data for processing. Some temperature reading
technologies in this area are notoriously inaccurate. 34 The equipment can
be deployed incorrectly by inexperienced operators, be misallocated for
human core temperature readings, or can measure surface skin
temperatures in inaccurate environments (such as extreme summer heat)
that will vary readings significantly. 35 Thus, checkpoints based upon
thermometers can be both over- and under-inclusive. First, they can
under-inclusively screen for fevers, allowing travelers carrying COVID19 to pass through the checkpoint and infect many others. Second, they
can generate false positives, finding higher temperature readings for
individuals who have recently exercised or stood near an ambient heat

32. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313–14 (1997).
33. The government might also argue that the exigent circumstances exception applies.
Warrantless searches taken under exigent circumstances—such as the needs to provide urgent aid to
a citizen, continue hot pursuit of a suspect, or prevent the imminent destruction of evidence—do not
amount to a search triggering the warrant requirement. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011).
But that exception does not fit comfortably to COVID-related surveillance. Exigent circumstances
usually encompass a single case or potential danger, such as where the residents behind a closed door
are either in harm’s way or likely to destroy evidence of wrongdoing. The potentially massive scale
of temperature grabs, all conducted without any suspicion of wrongdoing, is of a different order from
usual exigent circumstances.
34. Yaffe-Bellany, supra note 27.
35. Repko, supra note 27; Yaffe-Bellany, supra note 27.
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source. 36 Conditioning travel and work rights on such readings is highly
troublesome. It may be akin to using gang affiliation information as a
proxy for likely crime commission, a practice that can perpetuate
underlying racial and socio-economic biases in the predictive policing
context. And just as individual sentencing factors must be pertinent and
within an individual’s control, temperature readings must be pertinent
(meaning taken accurately) and based upon the actual body temperature
of citizens, rather than external factors like the weather that may influence
the results. Thus, the government must deploy the right temperaturegrabbing technologies using proper techniques, thereby accurately
measuring core body temperature to control citizens’ movements.
B.

Technological Surveillance Tools and Constitutional Strictures.

Second, we also agree that the government can use its traditional
technological tools of surveillance to chart the path of anyone whom they
have reason to believe is carrying the virus. Such technologies may be
critical in limiting the virus’ spread through “contact and trace”
approaches that many jurisdictions are considering. 37 Just as in the
predictive policing context, extra scrutiny, whether based on observation
or cell phone metadata records, 38 does not by itself transcend Fourth
Amendment limits 39 although, as we discuss, constraints should be placed
on use of the information after the contact tracing has come to an end. In
Europe, many countries have relied upon aggregation of data that has been
anonymized to avoid revealing any individual’s locations, movements, or
behaviors. Mobile phone companies in Italy, Germany, and Austria have
begun sharing such aggregated data with governments to broadly map
patterns in citizens’ movements that might reveal trends in compliance
with government quarantine orders. 40 Other governments have chosen a

36. Repko, supra note 27.
37. See, e.g., Erin Sampson & Adam Conner, Digital Contact Tracing to Contain the
Coronavirus, Center for American Progress, April 22, 2020; Dennis Thompson, As States Reopen,
What is “Contact Tracing” and How Does it Work, U.S. News, May 4, 2020.
38. This “third-party doctrine” allows government investigators to warrantlessly access broad
financial information or metadata about phone calls made to others. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
435, 442–43 (1976); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–46 (1979).
39. We believe that both the federal and state governments have critical roles to play in reacting
to the crisis. The constitutional questions we address do not depend on the identity of the
governmental actor.
40. Elvira Pollina & Douglas Busvine, European Mobile Operators Share Data for
Coronavirus Fight, REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2020, 9:55 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-healthcoronavirus-europe-telecoms/european-mobile-operators-share-data-for-coronavirus-fightidUSKBN2152C2 [https://perma.cc/LN3J-C3F8].
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more authoritarian approach that tracks individuals’ locations and
contacts in order to enforce quarantine orders. 41 Governments have also
aggregated financial transactional data as a means of tracking citizens’
movements and associations during the pandemic, though it is unclear
whether individual citizens’ data remains anonymous or encrypted.
Anonymization of data is an important first step to protecting
individual data privacy and constitutional rights.42 It ensures that any
pandemic surveillance is generalized and programmatic, which is less
constitutionally troubling. 43 Generalized, programmatic government
intrusions on personal privacy can be conducted without focusing the
weight of the state on an individual suspect, potentially introducing biases
based upon ethnic, racial, or socioeconomic backgrounds. 44 By focusing
pandemic surveillance on anonymized and aggregated data, governments
can avoid highly intrusive access to individual information that might
generate more social anxiety or be used to deny other rights or benefits to
those individuals. As we suggest in Part III, however, governments must
take additional protective measures beyond anonymization and
aggregation to ensure that sensitive personal data is not later revealed and
utilized without a warrant or probable cause. These measures could
include sunsetting the data collection, housing the data with trustworthy
third parties, and timely destroying data that might be nefariously
repurposed once the pandemic passes.
Moreover, we agree that isolation is appropriate for anyone whom
the government believes, based on data, is very likely to be suffering from
the coronavirus. The loss of liberty is palpable, but the public interest in
sequestration is strong as well. In the related context of mental illness, the
41. Id.; Gabriel Leung, Lockdown Can’t Last Forever. Here’s How to Lift It, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/opinion/coronavirus-end-social-distancing.html
[https://perma.cc/ED6G-5SGL] (“In China, the location-based functions of the online payment
platforms of Alibaba, Baidu and Tencent could be used to track people’s activity.”).
42. European Data Protection Board, Statement on the Processing of Personal Data in the
Context
of
the
COVID-19
Outbreak,
at
2
(Mar.
19,
2020),
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpb_statement_2020_processingpersonaldataandc
ovid-19_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9HW-FZ7C] (“Public authorities should first seek to process
location data in an anonymous way (ie. processing data aggregated in a way that individuals cannot
be re-identified), which could enable generating reports on the concentration of mobile devices at a
certain location (‘cartography’).”).
43. See Michael Gentithes, Suspicionless Witness Stops: The New Racial Profiling, 55 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3420816 [https://perma.cc/KRW5-WGH4].
44. See id. For a discussion of the distinction between programmatic searches and targeted
searches, see Barry Friedman and Cynthia Benin Stein, Redefining What’s “Reasonable”: The
Protections for Policing, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 281, 286–87 (2016) and BARRY FRIEDMAN,
UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 177–78 (2017).
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Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas 45 held that the state had to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that preventative detention was justified to
prevent an individual from doing harm to self or others. Although some
early testing for the virus may have been inexact, the tests have improved
to the point that the state may justifiably order isolation for anyone who
tests positive—the risk to others has been all too plainly demonstrated.46
The possibility that the test is accurate is high and the risk of release so
great that isolation is warranted. Although state courts have articulated
somewhat different standards of review for assessing isolation directives
and quarantine, a number have analogized to the involuntary commitment
context addressed in Addington. 47 We presume that all state isolation and
quarantine determinations will be subject to a comparable form of
heightened review.
Quarantining all those who have been in contact with someone
infected poses a more difficult question. As in the predictive policing
context, public health authorities must have particularized information
that an individual has been exposed. Even then, such individuals have a
modest chance of catching the disease, which undermines the potential
relevance of that data and the fairness of using it to condition travel and
work rights. China forced such individuals, and even those not exposed,
into quarantine. 48 Would that be constitutional here? The probabilities of
infection are unclear—how direct must the exposure be, what are the odds
of infection, and so on. On the one hand, the public interest in quarantine
is strong but, on the other, the odds that any individual exposed will catch
the disease are more modest.
To satisfy the clear and convincing or similar standard, the means
used by the government also must be reasonably tailored. The condition
of confinement, whether in one’s home or in a prison, should be
considered, as should the length of confinement. Is fourteen days

45. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
46. Laurie McGinley, FDA steps up scrutiny of coronavirus antibody tests to ensure accuracy,
WASH. POST, (May 4, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/05/04/fda-steps-upscrutiny-coronavirus-antibody-tests-ensure-accuracy/ [https://perma.cc/ZVM6-PUBJ] (“The tougher
requirements will make it harder to buy questionable tests, but officials say there should still be
enough reliable options for hospitals, doctors and consumers.”)
47. See, e.g., Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661, 663 (W. Va. 1980); Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d
265 (N.J. Super. 1993); Best v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, No. 03 CV.0365, 2003 WL 21518829
(S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2003); State v. Snow, 324 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Ark. 1959).
48. Nectar Gan, Lily Lee & David Culver, Healthy Wuhan Residents Say They Were Forced
Into Mass Coronavirus Quarantine, Risking Infection, CNN (Feb. 23, 2020, 7:16 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/22/asia/china-coronavirus-roundup-intl-hnk/index.html
[https://perma.cc/2XNN-NTTF].
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reasonable? Ten? 49 The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act,
written at the behest of the Center for Disease Control in the wake of 9/11,
recognized that governmental public health measures should utilize the
least restrictive means available and permit judicial review. 50 Although a
close question, we believe that the government would be able to meet the
clear and convincing standard as long as those quarantined have at least
an informal right to contest the evidence that they have been exposed to
the virus—was it a case of mistaken identity, did the person who allegedly
expose them end up not contracting the virus, and so on.
C.

Antibody Testing: Constitutional Limitations for a Staggered
Return to Normalcy.

Italy, 51 Great Britain, 52 and New York 53 have considered allowing
those who have developed antibodies to return to work and travel. They
can look to the Chinese government’s example, for it instituted software
in common chatting and payment apps that require citizens to fill out a
health survey, and then issued individuals a colored health code that
dictates their ability to travel past checkpoints in subway stations,
restaurants, hotels, and apartment blocks. 54 Researchers remain uncertain
if antibodies will indicate a lasting immunity to COVID-19, and whether
that immunity might also apply to future mutations or strains of the virus,
for which those with antibodies may still act as carriers. 55 And not
everyone without the antibodies is susceptible of catching the virus. 56 The

49. Cf. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (explaining how government must show
under clear and convincing evidence that reasonable conditions would not have ensured the continued
presence of an individual subject to a deportation order).
50. See Lawrence O. Gostin, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Public Health
and Civil Liberties in a Time of Terrorism, 13 Health Matrix 1, 19 (2003) (providing that officials
“m\ust use the least restrictive means available” in pursuing isolation and quarantines).
51. See Horowitz, supra note 2.
52. Mark Landler & Stephen Castle, After Lost Months, Britain Vows to Catch Up on Virus
Testing, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/world/europe/ukcoronavirus-testing.html [https://perma.cc/TJ6Y-2P69].
53. See Horowitz, supra note 2.
54. Sophia Ankel, As China Lifts Its Coronavirus Lockdowns, Authorities Are Using a ColorCoded Health System to Dictate Where Citizens Can Go. Here’s How It Works, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-china-health-software-color-codedhow-it-works-2020-4 [https://perma.cc/9PAM-EDXM].
55. Horowitz, supra note 2.
56. See Stacey McKenna, What Immunity to COVID-19 Really Means, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN
(Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-immunity-to-covid-19-reallymeans/ [https://perma.cc/7ZSE-UPAS].
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test for antibodies itself, so far, is inexact.57 Predicating such critical
liberty interests as the right to work and travel on such probabilities
challenges our notion of fundamental rights. We would be embracing two
classes of citizenship, which may be both under- and over-inclusive.
Without sufficient scientific support for the number and type of antibodies
that effectively shield an individual from infection, using antibody tests
as a guide to reentry will likely allow some unsafe individuals to return to
normal life while denying basic rights to work and travel to others who
are perfectly healthy. Under the demanding clear and convincing standard
of review, courts could decide the constitutionality of these antibodybased reentry programs either way, likely depending upon the strength of
the presentation by health experts.
The general quarantine carries with it the process protection that
everyone is affected—there is no danger that the government is picking
and choosing whom to elevate into the first rung. 58 A police checkpoint
that focuses on everyone passing by poses less danger to civil liberties
than a roving power to stop anyone at will. 59 In contrast, the antibody
scenario would change that, and at high stakes.
Governments would also need to ensure that licenses to travel are
distributed without bias that might trace traditional racial, ethnic, or socioeconomic divides. This may be especially difficult if the tests for
antibodies are particularly expensive and the costs are borne even partially
by individuals. Poorer citizens may have been more likely to face
infection in the first place, 60 making them strong candidates to have
developed antibodies as a result of those infections. But if they cannot
afford the tests, their antibodies will go undetected and they will remain
quarantined indefinitely. Thus, the government must provide such
57. See Sheila Kaplan, FDA Orders Companies to Submit Antibody Test Data, N.Y. Times,
May 4, 2020; Camilla Hodgson & George Parker, UK Government Admits Covid-19 Antibody Tests
Don’t Work (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/f28e26a0-bf64-4fac-acfb-b3a618ca659d
[https://perma.cc/U6PN-YPEE].
58. There has been a trickle of litigation about whether a particular business constitutes an
“essential” service, but that has been the exception. The vast majority of citizens have been impacted
by the shelter orders. See, e.g., Christian McPhate, Why McKinney’s Mayor Ordered Nonessential
Businesses to Close–And Why He Was Sued For It, LOCAL PROFILE (Collin County, Texas) (Mar. 31,
2020), https://localprofile.com/2020/03/31/why-mckinneys-mayor-ordered-nonessential-businessesto-close-and-why-he-was-sued-for-it/ [https://perma.cc/7YW4-6QDK]; Erica Orden, NRA Suing New
York for Deeming Gun Stores Non-Essential Businesses During Coronavirus Pandemic, CNN, (Apr.
4, 2020, 1:39 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/03/politics/nra-new-york-gun-store-nonessential/index.html [https://perma.cc/H7LR-AZW4].
59. See Gentithes, supra note 43.
60. See, e.g., Sam Baker, Alison Snyder, Coronavirus hits poor, minority communities harder,
AXIOS, (April 4, 2020) https://www.axios.com/coronavirus-cases-deaths-race-income-disparitiesunequal-f6fb6977-56a1-4be9-8fdd-844604c677ec.html [https://perma.cc/6CSD-E78F].
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antibody tests at no charge, in addition to ensuring that those in rural as
well as urban areas have comparable access.
Moreover, in light of the liberty interests at stake, the government
must permit individuals in the second class an opportunity to contest their
placement. Those individuals might assert a right to be retested or argue
that the test, although effective for most, is not indicative given their
specific biological makeup. In light of the need for speed and the huge
number of individuals in the second grouping, the hearings would be
streamlined. Although the state need not provide a hearing before the
classification, a reasonably prompt hearing after the classification should
be required. Any such balancing calls to mind the Due Process framework
of Mathews v. Eldridge 61—the individual’s interests in travel and work
are of course substantial, but so is the government’s goal of preventing
too many people from travelling and congregating together. In short, if
the government pursues the antibody approach, it must afford individuals
a limited right to contest public health authorities’ determination that they
lack the antibodies necessary for resumption of normal social activities.
The nature of the government test for antibodies also raises
constitutional hurdles. Assume that governments can only determine
whether an individual possesses the antibodies in question through a blood
draw. If the government hinges the rights to work and travel upon the
results of such blood draws, it will effectively coerce all citizens to submit
to those blood draws. Citizens’ desires to be released from quarantine may
be so strong as to compel them to accept a government blood draw as a
condition for that release. 62
Such coerced blood draws, taken without suspicion that an individual
has committed any crime or run afoul of any quarantine orders, could
violate the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court has previously held
that blood draws, even conducted after a lawful arrest, are considered
Fourth Amendment searches for which a warrant is normally required. 63
The mere fact that the contents of one’s blood may change quickly
through normal metabolic processes is not a sufficiently exigent
circumstance to fit an exception to the warrant requirement. 64 Although
61. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
62. In a related context, some authors have argued that prisoners’ desire for release from
incarceration is so strong that they cannot meaningfully agree to conditions attached to their probation
or even pardon. See Harold J. Krent, Conditioning the President’s Conditional Pardon Power, 89
CAL. L. REV. 1665, 1684–85 (2001).
63. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013).
61
Id. at 152 (“In those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a
warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the
search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so.”).
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the Court has recently permitted warrantless blood draws from
unconscious vehicle operators suspected of driving under the influence, 65
that ruling considered blood draws from an individual driver found
unconscious at the scene of an accident, where there was strong reason to
believe the driver committed a crime, the driver’s blood would likely be
tested at a hospital shortly in any event, and the officer’s duties in
responding to the accident itself make obtaining a warrant
impracticable. 66 None of those criteria fits mandatory blood draws on a
massive scale without any individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.
Perhaps the government’s strongest argument again relies upon the
special needs doctrine, including the impracticability of obtaining
individual warrants for antibody tests and the government interest in
restarting economic activity rather than controlling crime.
Given the sympathy for the government’s power during a pandemic,
courts might well uphold any plan to allow those who test positive for
antibodies to return to work first, as well as to attend school, travel and so
forth. The government’s highly critical need to limit the pandemic’s
spread arguably justifies the sharp distinction drawn between those who
are less and more likely to contract the disease. But the government must
accompany any such determination with scientific evidence of the test’s
efficacy, and the government must afford those relegated to their homes a
measure of Due Process. Just as algorithms used in sentencing must
ensure that the individual characteristics considered are pertinent and fair,
government use of antibody tests to condition the rights to travel and work
must be proven to have a scientifically valid connection to the likelihood
of infecting others.
The antibody approach comes with risks. Once more people are
working outside of home and travelling, enforcement of the quarantine
becomes more difficult. Moreover, those without the antibodies and
desperate to work may be tempted to become infected so as thereafter to
reenter the workforce. 67 This potential moral hazard risks undermining the
effectiveness of the quarantines themselves. Nonetheless, the two-class
citizenship plan presents an option to the government in the recovery
period if it tailors the program narrowly; permits individuals adversely
affected to question their placement in the stay-at-home category; ensures
that information gathered is not used for later crime control purposes; and
65.
66.
67.

Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2531 (2019).
Id.
Restarting America Means People Will Die. So When Do We Do It?, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/10/magazine/coronavirus-economydebate.html [https://perma.cc/V29T-BU3Y].
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deploys such policies based upon sound scientific data about antibody
development and immunity.
III. BAKING IN PROTECTIONS
The government should protect privacy in any pandemic surveillance
plan as much as possible. First, any pandemic surveillance program that
analyzes personal data must come with clear sunset provisions ensuring
that the program does not continue in perpetuity once the pandemic has
passed. As the European Data Protection Board noted in its recent
statement on processing personal data during the pandemic, emergency
conditions might legitimize processing of personal data only if limited to
the emergency period and not turned into a permanent program. 68 Only
clear sunset provisions can ensure that governments resist the temptation
to turn pandemic surveillance techniques into a new normal for society. 69
Second, quarantine surveillance programs should ensure that data
accessed during the outbreak is in safe hands and is destroyed once the
crisis passes. Even if data has been anonymized and aggregated during the
pandemic, there is no guarantee against future technological advantages
that might allow the re-identification of individuals within the set.
Furthermore, government investigators might develop new algorithms
with aims entirely unrelated to the pandemic in future years, repurposing
the data set in ways that could again focus on individuals rather than
groups or otherwise curtail individual rights. If governments maintain the
data well into the future, they create the potential for gross invasions of
personal privacy. 70 And if the data at issue includes information such as
cell-site location data or highly sensitive medical records, such invasions
might also run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. A proposal from the
Center for American Progress suggests housing such data in a nongovernmental, non-profit entity, which would routinely destroy any data
collected every 45 days. 71 Such plans would helpfully reduce the longterm privacy risks inherent in these surveillance programs.

68. European Data Protection Board, supra note 42.
69. After 9/11, Congress included a sunset provision in the Patriot Act, although it was
renewed after a prolonged debate, and subsequently amended. Martin Matishak, Surveillance
Authorities Set to Lapse, Politico (Mar. 12, 2020, 7:58 PM), https://www.politico.com/
news/2020/03/12/rand-paul-to-oppose-surveillance-bill-127128 [https://perma.cc/T2L5-TRBM].
70. See Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions under the Fourth
Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 81 (1995) (making comparable argument about the risk of retaining
information in DNA databanks).
71. Zeke Emanuel et al., A National and State Plan to End the Coronavirus Crisis, CENTER
FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Apr. 3, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/

74

CONLAWNOW

[12:57

Third, pandemic surveillance must avoid creating a kind of “new
normal” for citizens that lowers Fourth Amendment protections into the
future. The restrictions that the Fourth Amendment places upon
government investigators are based in large part upon society’s reasonable
expectations of privacy. 72 But the government itself shapes those
expectations in part through new, highly-public programs that invade
spheres of life previously considered private. 73 Society’s view of what
types and volumes of personal data should be kept away from peering
governmental eyes can change as a result of such public programs that
seem acceptable in times of short-term distress like the current pandemic.
As citizens become inured to new and broader invasions of privacy,
“reasonable expectations” of privacy under the Fourth Amendment
decline. Publicizing the temporary nature of pandemic surveillance
programs, along with providing clear explanations of their scientific
validity and the process by which the data will later be destroyed, will
keep pandemic surveillance under extreme circumstances from becoming
standard government procedure for years into the future.
CONCLUSION
The pandemic swirling around us is unprecedented. Accordingly,
unprecedented measures are needed to combat its spread. Although the
Fourth Amendment may bend in such times, concerns for privacy should
not be thrust aside in a rush to return to normalcy. Government decisions
to isolate, quarantine, and (possibly) allow only one stratum of society to
return to work must proceed only after reasonable scientific certainty is
reached, and then only if those adversely affected can contest their
placement in the disfavored group. Differentiating groups of citizens
based on predictive analytics has proven dangerous in the past and may
well prove so again in the coming months.
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